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1. Introduction 
The main thesis I will defend in this paper is that emotions through their effects on thoughts 
and language are major tools for explaining social life. Indeed, emotions are critical for the 
social explanation of social subjects’ thinking and speaking, because emotions motivate and 
structure normative thinking and speeches and can contribute to the foundation of institutional 
facts. Emotions will be described as being intimately related to values and norms: emotions are 
the motivational grounds that motivate social subjects to articulate their reasoning and speech 
acts with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It will 
be shown that each type of emotion (contempt, indignation, etc.), generates its own constitutive 
judgements and structures normative thinking and speech acts according to its own logic. 
Emotions allow us to explain how social subjects reason and argue through norms and values, 
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and how social subjects constitute, maintain or destroy their social institutions through 
language1. 
Various social scientists, motivated by the methodological questions “how can we observe 
emotions in texts?”, have already emphasized the relation between emotions and language but 
by focusing mainly on narrative analysis and emotions2 or on speech acts and emotions3. The 
links between emotions, normative judgements and argumentation do not seem to have been 
centrally addressed in this literature. This diagnosis is more general and concerns the dominant 
currents of sociological theory which tend to neglect, as sociologist Boudon (2004) explains, 
the importance of emotions, normative judgements and argumentation for sociological 
explanation. Yet, their importance can be noticed in the realm of politics where emotions and 
rhetoric tend to go hand in hand (Aristote, 2007; Durnova et al., 2016; Micheli, 2010; Plantin, 
2011): here emotions can ground argumentation that aims at convincing an audience or at 
reinforcing its ideology. My paper will then be a contribution to this neglected research field in 
sociology. 
Since argumentation is a social activity which requires speech acts, my paper will also 
investigate certain major relationships between emotions and speech acts, and especially the 
way emotions ground speech acts that have the potential power to introduce changes in social 
reality. An understanding of how emotions impact language and social life can be found in the 
influential work of Ahmed (2014) who has shown that emotions can lead to the utterance of 
speech acts and thus to changes in social reality. Nonetheless, the mechanisms through which 
these changes occur are not outlined by Ahmed. My paper will on the contrary offer such an 
explanation: emotions’ action tendencies can translate into speech acts that serve to 
linguistically realize the emotional goal of the considered emotion, and these speech acts being 
declarations have the power to (un-)make social reality. To do so, I will rely on an author that 
Ahmed does not discuss at all: John Searle. I will use his theory on how declarations contribute 
to the constitution, the maintenance and the destruction of institutional facts (Searle, 1998, 
2010), and will partly reconsider his speech acts taxonomy through the lens of emotions (Searle, 
1976).  
Let me add, that different emotions will be discussed in this paper, but the examples of 
indignation and contempt will be used extensively over the course of the argumentation. The 
                                                 
1 To defend these claims the paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach by mobilizing sociological, 
philosophical, psychological and linguistic researches on emotions belonging to cognitivist traditions. 
2 See for instance Kleres (2011) and the edited volume by Flam and Kleres (2015). 
3 See for instance Ahmed (2014)  and Reddy (2001). 
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reasons are twofold. First it is didactic: it appears to me that it is easier to focus on two types of 
emotions to make my claims while complementing some ideas with the help of other types of 
emotions (envy, disgust, fear, forgiveness). Second, in my discussion of how emotions can 
contribute through speech acts to the (un-)making of institutional facts I will present findings 
of sociological studies that show that in the political collective Occupy Geneva the indignation 
and contempt of the members of this small-scale society led them to promulgate new “legal 
rules” through declarations (Minner, 2015, 2018). So, it seemed convenient to me to use these 
two emotions throughout the paper in order to prepare the reader for this section4.  
These remarks lead me to the presentation of the structure of the paper. The first section 
addresses the question of how emotions generate cognitive activities related to the making of 
evaluative and deontic5 judgements, the mastering of normative concepts, and the building of 
normative arguments. The second section elaborates the view that emotions can ground speech 
acts and contribute to the (un-)making of the social world. The third section consists of the 
conclusion and synthesizes the arguments that I have put forth.  
2. How emotions generate and structure normative judgements and 
argumentation? 
Emotions are motive states that motivate individuals in different ways, affecting not only their 
actions, but also their thoughts. Because emotions “affect the whole organism” (Frijda, 2007)—
both the body and the mind—we can say that, in addition to “action tendencies6”, emotions also 
possess “cognitive tendencies”7: they make people act and think in certain ways that are 
determined by the very nature of the emotion felt. This accounts, for example, for the fact that 
the thoughts of contemptuous individuals differ from those of indignant ones. In this section, I 
will explore the cognitive tendencies of emotions and pay particular attention to the manner in 
which they generate and structure normative judgements and the related argumentations. 
                                                 
4 In different places before this section, I will already refer to these empirical studies to backup theoretical 
arguments. 
5 Deontic judgements are judgements stating norms; that is permissions, interdictions, or obligations. These 
judgements are typically expressed by words like should (should not), or ought (ought not). 
6 Action tendencies are impulses to accomplish types of action (Frijda, 1986, 2007). 
7 Action tendencies extend on cognitive processes (Frijda, 2007) ; that is why we can speak of the cognitive 
tendencies of emotions. 
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2.1. Emotions and normative judgements 
Emotions are thought-dependent (de Sousa, 1987) in the sense that their occurrence depends on 
cognitive states (Frijda, 2007) such as belief, knowledge, memory and perception, which 
constitute their cognitive bases (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). These cognitive bases operate as 
the “cognitive antecedents” (Elster, 1999) that trigger occurrent emotions. Emotions are, 
however, also thought-directing, for they direct various kinds of cognitive states, including 
attention, belief, perceptual sensitivity (Frijda, 2007) and—especially important for our 
discussion—normative judgements (Solomon, 2003). 
Emotions are thought-directing because they motivate cognition and give rise to thoughts and 
inferences whose nature depends on the nature of the considered emotion, and the moment that 
the emotion is felt. In this way, the thoughts generated during an emotional episode are “parts 
of the emotions” (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000: 51), or in other words, these thoughts are 
“constitutive” of the emotions (Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 2003) and are formed during the 
emotional episode: intrinsic cognitions are thus generated, and “sustained” (Solomon, 2003). 
The fact that emotions generate various kinds of thoughts and inferences contrasts with the role 
of their cognitive bases, which function as the emotions’ “cognitive antecedents”.  
When emotionally aroused, an individual starts to think in specific ways that are anchored in 
the motivational tendencies of the felt emotion. The kinds of thoughts involved are dependent 
upon the type of emotion felt, which means that there exists a relationship of ontological 
dependency where the identity of the thought depends on the identity of the emotion. Indeed, 
each emotion type possesses motivational tendencies that exert effects on judgement, 
perceptual sensitivity, choice and decision by engendering “goal-directed processes” until “the 
emotion-eliciting problem is resolved” (Lerner and Keltner, 2000: 488).That is why we can 
speak of the cognitive tendencies of emotions complementing the idea that emotions have 
action tendencies. Thus, for each emotion-type, these cognitive tendencies imply different kinds 
of judgements, evaluations and perceptual sensitivities8 that are related to the values (a loss, an 
unjustified wrong, a danger) and valuations (concern for a loved one, justice, one’s life) 
associated with the emotion-type (sadness, indignation, fear). A central issue in this paper’s 
argument is how emotions engender normative judgements. 
                                                 
8 For a psychological understanding of the relationships between emotions and cognitions or judgements of 
causal attribution, predictions, and perceptual sensitivities, see Lerner et al.(2015). For the different kinds of 
appraisal checks related to emotions see for instance Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer (2005). In this paper, I do not 
address the important issue of how emotions can bias our judgements. 
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For example, judging that something is wrong and ought to cease, and that someone is 
responsible for the wrong and ought to be punished are normative judgements that seem to be 
proper to indignation9; whereas judging that a wrongdoer is a bad person who is unworthy of 
belonging to one’s social group, and who ought to be excluded from the group seems to be 
proper to contempt10. These examples allow us to say that emotions play different roles with 
respect to normative judgements: emotions seem to explain, justify (Deonna and Teroni, 2012) 
and structure (Solomon, 2003) normative judgements and, as a result, play a fundamental role 
in argumentation by articulating these judgements in arguments. 
Different researchers have already stressed that emotions motivate value judgements (Deonna 
and Teroni, 2012; Haidt, 2001; Nussbaum, 2001; Prinz, 2006; Solomon, 2003). Indeed, it 
appears that our value judgements often originate and result from the emotions that we 
experience. Emotions generate, while they are being experienced, different value judgements 
that can be said to be constitutive or intrinsic cognitions to the felt emotions (Nussbaum, 2001; 
Solomon, 2003): the occurrence and the identity of these judgements are dependent upon the 
occurrence and the identity of the related emotion. Moreover, these judgements can be detached 
from the emotion since they can still subsist after the emotional episode is over. As such, these 
judgements can be “cognitive subsequents” of the emotion. “Cognitive subsequents” are the 
judgements, beliefs, suppositions, memories, etc. that result from the emotions. For instance, 
an individual can still hold the judgement that something is wrong even when she is no longer 
experiencing the occurrent indignation from which the judgement stemmed. Or in the case of 
laws motivated by emotions, the written laws can be said to be the subsequent of the relevant 
emotions. In this way, emotions provide both an ontological and a causal explanation for the 
value judgements that the individual makes. 
Emotions also serve as a justification for these judgements (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). To 
illustrate this thesis, I will use an example taken from a sociological study that I conducted in 
the political collective Occupy Geneva. where I observed that indignation towards unjustified 
violence and contempt towards their perpetrators lead to the kinds of judgements reported in 
this section (Minner, 2018). Among the various aspects of the behaviours of the perpetrators, 
the most salient were: lack of respect towards other members through insults or personal attacks 
                                                 
9 Indignation is a reaction to unjustified wrongs (Descartes, 1996 [1649]) that were intentionally done by a 
wrongdoer (Strawson, 2008), and it calls for punishing the wrongdoer (Elster, 2007) in order to restore the 
“right” state of affairs (Minner, 2015). 
10 Contempt is a reaction to the “unworthiness” of a person (Roberts, 2003)  and it motivates so as to exclude her 
from one’s social group (Fisher and Roseman, 2007) in order to reestablish “virtue” (Minner, 2018). 
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and violent attempts11 to seize power, motivated by the desire to dominate and to enjoy higher 
prestige, rather than by a concern for the common good. These different infractions against the 
rules and values of the collective were appraised by the other members as types of unjustified 
violence and triggered much indignation. But they also triggered contempt toward the 
wrongdoers who, perpetrating these wrongs knowingly, were perceived from then on as 
“incorrigible” and as manifesting “vices.” So, in these situations of unjustified violence the 
judgement “This is wrong” was deemed to be justified because the indignation from which it 
stems was deemed to correctly fit its object (e.g. violent attempts to seize power “genuinely” 
exemplify a kind of wrong): the judgement was justified by indignation that was itself justified. 
In the same vein, the judgement “The violent individual is a bad person” was deemed to be 
justified because the contempt from which it resulted was deemed to correctly fit its object (e.g. 
a violent individual is “genuinely” unworthy in the eyes of the contemptuous): the judgement 
was justified by contempt that was itself justified. This means that a value judgement can be 
justified by an emotion that is itself justified (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). 
However, emotions do more than just motivate value judgements. Emotions also present their 
objects in both an evaluative and a deontic fashion. Deontic judgements—in addition to value 
judgements—seem to result from the action tendencies of emotions. For example, the deontic 
judgements “This wrong ought to cease!” and “The culprit ought to be punished!” seem to be 
anchored in the action tendencies of indignation which motivates the “nullification of the 
wrong” (Minner, 2015) and the “punishment of the culprit” (Elster, 2007) and, while the deontic 
judgements “The wrongdoer ought to be excluded from our group” and “We ought to restore 
probity” seem to be anchored in the action tendencies of contempt which motivates the 
“exclusion of the wrongdoer” (Fisher and Roseman, 2007) and the “re-establishment of virtue” 
(Minner, 2018). This means that the deontic judgements that originate from the action 
tendencies of emotions can be explained and justified by the relevant emotion, just as value 
judgements are explained and justified by the relevant emotion. 
But how can we understand the structuring role of emotions on normative judgements, or in 
other words: How do emotions articulate the “system of judgements” (Solomon, 2003) of value 
judgements and deontic judgements? How do they represent the motivational ground that holds 
these judgements together? To answer these questions, one has to turn to the intrinsic normative 
structure of emotions and the various ways by which to assess whether an emotion fits its 
objects.  
                                                 
11 These violent attempts consisted mainly in intimidation, psychological pressure, and threats of physical 
aggression. 
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2.2. The intrinsic normativity of emotions 
One could say in a Smithian spirit (Smith, 2002: 79) that whoever appears to be the “proper” 
object of indignation appears to “deserve” punishment, and whoever appears to be the “proper” 
object of contempt appears to “deserve” to be excluded12. In that sense, normatively, 
indignation is correct if a wrong was actually committed by an ill-willed agent, and this person 
is the correct target of the tendency to punish if she really was the ill-willed agent responsible 
for this wrong. The same can be said for contempt. Normatively, contempt is correct if a 
wrongdoer by his or her deeds has shown that he or she is an unworthy person, and the 
wrongdoer is the correct target of the tendency to exclude if he or she is genuinely a bad person. 
Note that the notion of correctness used in this passage simply means that an emotion fits its 
object if it correctly represents the object as having the relevant (dis-)value (D’Arms and 
Jacobson, 2000; Deonna and Teroni, 2012). “Correctness” should then be distinguished from 
the “moral appropriateness” of emotions. In order to differentiate these two concepts, one can 
distinguish between two kinds of norms related to emotions: extrinsic norms and intrinsic 
norms (Minner, 2015). To demonstrate the contrast between the extrinsic and the intrinsic 
interpretations of norms, let us consider the example of envy. Consider the expression “what 
ought to be felt” and Victor’s envy toward Edis, a successful leader. In the extrinsic sense, if 
envy is considered a “vice” in Victor’s society, his envy will be assessed as inappropriate for 
moral reasons: he ought not to be envious. In the intrinsic sense, however, Victor’s envy can 
be assessed as appropriate because Edis, his rival, was a preeminent leader, and that position 
was a good that Victor envied. In this case, envy is “appropriate” because it correctly represents 
(or fits) its object as being enviable (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000). This example shows that 
even if envy can be socially inappropriate for moral reasons, it can be correct if its object is 
accurately presented as being enviable (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000). As such, envy “ought to 
be felt” because of the emotion’s intrinsic norms, but “ought not to be felt” because of social 
norms technically called “emotion norms” (Hochschild, 2003; Thoits, 2004) 13. 
                                                 
12 Smith takes the example of gratitude and resentment to analyze the different ways emotions correctly fit their 
objects. I substitute them with indignation and contempt because, as I have explained in the introduction, I rely 
on my empirical studies of Occupy Geneva that have shown that the members of this social collective 
collectively assessed their indignation and contempt towards wrongdoers as correct and justified and these 
emotions led them to create new rules for their charters of good conduct (Minner, 2015, 2018). 
13 Note that an emotion can be both correct and socially appropriate. In the context of a given society, (just like 
in the collective Occupy Geneva), indignation towards unjustified violence can be deemed correct because 
unjustified violence is seen as exemplifying an unjustified wrong, and indignation can also be deemed socially 
appropriate because of the ethical values of the collective (Minner, 2015). 
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Returning to the examples of indignation and contempt, they show that emotions do not only 
have one intentional object, as is often said14, but rather have many objects that are set by the 
very nature of the emotion under consideration (de Sousa, 1987; Solomon, 1993). Indeed, 
indignation and contempt are about emotional situations that are seen as exemplifying kinds of 
(dis-)values (a wrong, a vice, etc.), but they also involve the person targeted by the emotions 
(the wrongdoer, the “vicious”), the person who feels them, (respectively, the outraged person 
and the contemptuous one), and the person who is seen as the “proper” target of their respective 
action tendencies (to punish, to exclude). In addition to these various evaluative categorizations, 
the emotions also involve, as noted above, different intrinsic norms or “affective oughts”. This 
means that each emotion-type presents its objects in both an evaluative manner and a deontic 
one. Indignation, for example, presents the action as harm and the agent as a wrongdoer on an 
evaluative basis; on a deontic basis, it presents the wrong as “requiring” indignation and the 
agent as having to be punished. On an evaluative basis, contempt presents the deviant as an 
unworthy or bad person, on a deontic one, it presents this person as “requiring” contempt and 
as having to be excluded. In short, indignation and contempt ought to be felt if their objects 
were, respectively, wrong or unworthy, and the wrongdoer and the despised individual ought 
to be, respectively, punished or excluded. This observation is very important: it shows that the 
norms apply because the related values obtain (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). There are relations 
of derivation, explanation and justification between the intrinsic norms of emotions and the 
values to which they react and that they target: the norms apply and are explained and justified 
because of the relevant values. This accounts for the fact that emotions seem to bind together 
norms and values and even more to bind certain kinds of norms with certain kinds of values. 
For instance, indignation brings together a valuing of the right and the good, the disvalues of 
an unjustified wrong and badness, and norms for punishing the wrongdoer and preventing the 
unjust situation from occurring again; contempt brings together a valuing of virtue, the 
disvalues of unworthiness and badness, and norms for excluding the contemptible and restoring 
virtue. 
Emotions are, then, the cognitive and conative grounds that hold together the normative 
domain. They allow us make the “transition” between values, norms and the respective value 
and deontic judgements: value judgements represent the world as it is (or seems to be) by 
identifying certain values that (seem to) obtain, whereas deontic judgements represent the world 
as it should be by presenting certain norms that should be realized in the world and that can 
                                                 
14 See, for instance, Deonna & Teroni (2012) or Elster (1999). 
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"carry motivational force that we experience as being under [an] obligation" (Prinz, 2006: 36) 
to change the world so as to adjust it both to the contents of the deontic judgements and to the 
concern or state of valuing15 from which the emotion stems (the right, virtue, etc.)16. Emotions 
are thus concerned not only with ‘’the way the world is’’ but also with “the way the world ought 
to be” (Solomon, 1993: 153). In that sense, emotions through norms also contribute to promote 
the values that the world ought to exemplify. 
These various propositions have direct implications for the explanation of social life: emotions 
provide both an explanation for the presence and the validity of certain values and norms in 
social collectives by demonstrating how social subjects connect values and norms in their 
reasoning and translate them into actions. Since normative judgements and reasoning are 
concerned, we can substantiate the explanatory role of emotions by shifting our attention to 
language and argumentation. 
 
2.3. Emotions and argumentation 
In most social situations people verbally communicate17 and, therefore, are engaged in 
linguistic interactions. Among them, one is particularly important: argumentation, which occurs 
in many social contexts and institutions. These contexts represent various communicative 
situations where speakers publicly develop and share arguments that, grounded in their 
emotions, support the normative views they hold and help convince other people of the 
rightness of these views (Micheli, 2010). Emotions then play a major role in argumentation and 
rhetoric as strategic means that are deployed in order to try to convince an audience (Aristotle, 
2007; Plantin, 2011). Moreover, beyond their roles as strategic means or communicative 
strategies, emotions are also grounds that motivate and structure argumentation by providing 
the normative propositions that feature in arguments with their contents and their conceptual 
articulation. 
As indicated in the previous section, various normative judgements result from felt emotions, 
and these judgements find their explanations and justifications in the (un-)justified emotions 
from which they stem. I would like to further nuance this observation hereby noting that these 
judgements are by definition “reason-responsive” in the sense that we can always ask “why-
                                                 
15 Concerns can be understood as caring  about something which is valuable to the individual (Roberts, 2003); 
that is as states of valuing  (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). 
16 On the role of evaluations and concerns in the arousal of emotions see Frijda (2007). 
17 Of course communication is not only verbal, especially when it comes to emotion language. However, my 
focus in this paper is on speech. But see Scarantino (2017) for a pragmatic theory of emotional expressions. 
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questions”18 about them that, in principle, have an answer: “- Why does unjustified violence 
cause outrage?” “- Because it is wrong!”, “- Why should it be forbidden? - Because no one 
should suffer from it!” Therefore, one can answer these questions by providing reasons for the 
judgements: “Unjustified violence is wrong because it consists of inflicting undeserved 
sufferings to victims and nobody ought to suffer undeservedly.” When one is engaged in the 
social activity of providing reasons to back up one’s judgements, one is by definition arguing. 
Given the emotional source of these judgements, one can say that the reasons provided are also 
reasons in favor of the emotion that generated the judgements. That is why, as linguist Plantin 
(2011) says, emotions are “arguable”: they are typically objects of justifications connected to 
verbal interactions between speakers who disagree or try to convince an audience. This is also 
true with respect to verbal interactions between speakers who try to reinforce a point of view 
they share with their supporters (Micheli, 2010) who are predisposed to want to feel the emotion 
that is argued (Hochschild, 2016). This “arguable” character is, according to Plantin, mainly 
related to the reason-responsiveness of the cognitive antecedents of emotions. 
This, however, is only half of the story because, as noted earlier, each emotion-type possesses 
different intentional objects that are regimented by intrinsic norms dictated by the very nature 
of the emotion under scrutiny. Each of the “fittingness” relationships between an emotion and 
its various objects can therefore become an object of argumentation in public debate—a 
possibility that derives from the fact that emotions are both thought-dependent and thought-
directing and can be assessed as rational based on the conditions of correctness that help assess 
if an occurrent emotion fits its various objects. This fittingness also provides the grounds for 
justifying the related evaluative and deontic judgements that feature in an argument. For 
instance, in order to back up his arguments, an indignant or contemptuous individual can invoke 
the idea that certain values are important (concerns about justice; concerns about virtue), that 
certain social facts obtain (unjustified violence; being a violent individual) and instantiate kinds 
of disvalue (an unjustified wrong; a vice), and that these facts require norms for realizing the 
intentional goal of the emotion (norms for punishing violent individuals; norms for excluding 
them) and for changing the current situations in the social world (to forbid unjustified violence; 
to restore virtue). Thus, this adjustment of emotions to their various objects can be assessed by 
a public (or by the agent herself) as being socially appropriate thanks to “emotion norms” 
(Hochschild, 2003). And it is true that in practice, speakers often make evaluative judgements 
                                                 
18 On “reason-responsiveness” and “why-questions”, see Deonna &Teroni (2012). 
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and argue about the appropriateness of the emotions that are manifested during verbal 
interactions (Micheli, 2010). 
Thus, the study of the linguistic (Fontaine et al., 2013; Micheli, 2014), argumentative, and 
rhetorical manifestations of emotions (Micheli, 2010; Plantin, 2011; Walton, 1992) and 
therefore the way in which they affect social life through language (Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 
1990) is of major importance for explaining social life. Indeed, through language the various 
components of emotions (evaluation, feeling, motivational tendencies, expression, 
neurophysiology, regulation, etc.) can be semiotized (Fontaine et al., 2013; Micheli, 2014): the 
different characteristics of emotions are manifested through verbal signs and are 
communicable, making the emotions observable in language (Micheli, 2014): speakers attribute 
emotions to themselves as well as to others and use the rhetoric specific to the emotion being 
talked about; and emotions are arguable (justifiable and explainable) by virtue of their 
rationality (Micheli, 2010; Plantin, 2011). Indeed, someone may argue her emotion (either 
experienced or faked) by invoking the reasons which provoked it (cognitive evaluation), but 
she may also argue the different normative judgements and reasons for acting (action 
tendencies) of the emotion in social contexts where social agents are required to argue. 
2.4. The semantics of emotions 
Because my interest is in how emotions direct and structure thoughts, I focus on the relationship 
of dependency between the use of certain normative concepts that can appear in judgements 
and types of emotion. As Frijda & Mesquita (2000: 49) say “emotions […] generate the use of 
concepts that sustain certain beliefs […]”: for instance, the use of the word “cockroach” by 
Hutus to describe Tutsis evokes disgust (cockroaches are repelling), or the use of the word 
“terrorist” by Israel to describe the Palestinian guerrillas suggests danger and therefore evokes 
fear. In fact, to each emotion-type seems to correspond a specific lexicon consisting of specific 
words or concepts that are constitutive of the rhetoric of the considered emotion-type. For 
instance, the semantic field of indignation includes concepts like wrong, punishment, culprit, 
fault, unjust, unfair, scandal and scandalous, outrage, disrespectful, dignity, justice, respect, 
fairness, victim, indignation, etc., and the semantic field of contempt includes concepts like bad 
person, contemptible, unworthy, integrity, immorality, despicable, scorn, probity, improbity, 
denigration, vice, vicious, virtue, virtuous, banishment, exclusion, etc. The fact that emotion-
types “possess” their own lexicon and that felt emotions generate certain kinds of thoughts 
means that emotions, by directing thoughts, allow individuals to use the relevant notions from 
the lexicon of the kind of emotion that is felt. This means that when a person experiences an 
12 
emotional episode, she will be prone to use the family of concepts of the felt emotion: the 
emotion provides access to this vocabulary by bringing it to mind, selecting it and articulating 
it in a discourse that can be an argumentation19. 
Interestingly, the concepts at the heart of emotions are normative concepts. The lists given 
above for indignation and contempt seem to make this quite clear. And the result should be the 
same for words like “terrorist” or “cockroach”, which do not name a value but which are 
nevertheless value-laden, being connected, respectively, with danger and contamination20. 
These intimate connections between axiological concepts and emotions account for the fact that 
emotions help us use and master these concepts (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). But as mentioned 
earlier, emotions involve not only values but also norms. As a result, under the sway of an 
emotion, an individual will also be prone to use deontic concepts like should, ought, have to, 
must, etc. However, the fact remains that these deontic notions have no empirical content per 
se. Their empirical content comes from the state of affairs or the objects to which they relate 
and that ought to exemplify a certain value: one ought to punish the culprit, one should exclude 
the bad person, etc.—that is, the type of action or state of affairs that should obtain is given by 
the action tendencies of emotions. 
3. Emotions, speech acts and the (un-)making of society 
3.1. Emotions and speech acts 
Argumentation is typically a social activity that involves language. When they argue in front of 
an audience, people verbalize and exteriorize their thoughts that become public, by virtue of 
which they can be considered “speech acts”; that is, linguistic acts “such as making statements, 
giving commands, asking questions, making promises, […] referring and predicating” (Searle, 
1969: 16) “in which to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in saying 
something we are doing something.” (Austin, 1975: 12). After the in-depth discussion of value 
and deontic judgements in the previous sections, it is time now to turn our attention to the 
pragmatics of language and the proposition that, when uttered in public, these judgements 
constitute speech acts21 of two different sorts: evaluative and deontic speech acts. Evaluative 
                                                 
19 This thesis only claims that emotions determine the use of certain notions and facilitate access to this 
vocabulary; it says nothing about the degree of mastery that people have of their own language or their ability to 
build clear and convincing discourse. 
20 In fact, both terms could also be connected with contempt: many people would consider terrorists and “racial 
enemies” to be contemptible. See also Ahmed (2014) on terrorism/danger/fear and racism/contamination/disgust.  
21 This is not the place to engage in an extensive discussion of Searle’s theory of speech acts and his taxonomy 
of illocutionary acts (Searle, 1976), which includes “assertives”, “directives”, “comissives”, “expressives”, and 
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speech acts report that the world exemplifies certain (dis)-values and they have the “word-to-
world” direction of fit: they are correct if they correctly represent the world as having the stated 
value; they belong to the speech acts category of “assertive” for they represent something as 
being the case22. Deontic speech acts posit that the world ought to exemplify certain norms; 
they have the “world-to-word” direction of fit: they are correct if they correctly represent the 
world as having to realize the stated norm, and they belong to the speech acts category of 
“directives” for they provide direction for the realization of the state of affairs that should 
obtain.  
Beyond motivating evaluative and deontic speech acts, emotions also motivate their own kinds 
of speech acts, which are related to their action tendencies23. These are sentences that are uttered 
and that count as the verbal realizations of the action tendencies24: “I punish you” (indignation), 
“I thank you” (gratitude), “I exclude you” (contempt), “I forgive you” (forgiveness), “I 
apologize” (guilt), etc. These action tendencies can be realized by different intentional 
utterances (which may be verbal or written) that are different linguistic vehicles for realizing 
the emotional goal. For instance, the speech act “I punish you” can be realized by a judge who 
says, “I sentence you to a fine of 5,000 dollars!”, or by a parent who says to her child, “Go right 
now in your bedroom, and think about what you did!”. 
Searle would call this category of speech acts “expressive” because he says that they are related 
to our emotions. However, according to my argument, evaluative and deontic speech acts can 
also be grounded in emotions, and this kind of speech act is not simply “expressive” because it 
translates a genuine intention into an action that aims at realizing a certain state of affairs. 
                                                 
“declarations”. Nevertheless, as I will show below, this taxonomy seems to overlap with categories used when 
considering emotions. For example, making an evaluative speech act that identifies a (dis-)value in the world 
belongs to “assertives”, making a deontic speech act that states that a norm ought to be realized belongs to 
“directives”, saying “ouch”, “berk” or “wow” belongs to “expressives”, and speech acts like “I punish you”, “I 
pardon you”, etc. belong to “declarations.” The idea of the “world-to-words” and “words-to-world” directions of 
fit are taken from Searle (2010). 
22 Ahmed (2014) argues that what I call evaluative speech acts like “this thing is disgusting” are performative 
and “stick” to the objects towards which the speech act is directed: to say that something is disgusting makes it 
disgusting. But she seems to confuse the direction of fits of evaluative speech acts. Indeed, contrast the speech 
acts “This rotten meat is disgusting” with “Homosexuals are disgusting”. Both speech acts are evaluative 
judgements but if it is meaningful to say that the first sentence is correct because rotting carcasses are correctly 
disgusting (a person risks to be contaminated by germs if she eats rotting meat), the second sentence is 
meaningless in the sense that to attribute to homosexuals the property of being disgusting is not correct. As 
Nussbaum (2004) argues, disgust in this last case implies magic thinking: homophobes believe wrongly that they 
could be morally “contaminated” by homosexuals. To distinguish properly between the direction of fits of 
speech acts seems then to be crucial if one wants to critic biased ideologies. 
23 Austin (1975) calls the performative speech acts related to emotions “behabitives”: emotions have effects on 
the world through language utterances. I do not use Austin’s terminology, because “behabitives” are according 
to my analysis “declarative” speech acts. 
24 Solomon (1993: 165) would talk of “verbal action” that demands “an action” dictated by “the logic and 
ideology of the emotion and the particular circumstances”.  
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Indeed, there is a difference between saying “Ouch!” or “Berk!”, which report an internal state, 
and saying “I apologize”, “I punish you”, etc. Thus, emotions imply “expressive” speech acts 
(“ouch”, “berk”), as well as intentional speech acts that can be “declarative”: when a judge 
sentences someone to jail (indignation), when a king pardons a criminal (forgiveness), or when 
someone apologizes (guilt) or congratulates a winner (admiration) in the proper social contexts, 
they make declarations that are intentional and aim at bringing about some state of affairs; they 
represent the world as realizing an intended fact, and have both directions of fit, for in 
declarations, speakers “make something the case by declaring it is the case” (Searle, 2010: 69). 
In fact, intentional emotional speech acts have an identity of their own, which is determined by 
the action tendencies of the given emotion. It is not simply that someone does something by 
saying something; it is that what is said is an instance of a type of emotional goal. Interestingly, 
these kinds of emotional speech acts are also accessible to argumentation because of the 
relationship of correctness that governs whether the emotions’ action tendencies are suitable 
for the objects that they target. 
3.2. Emotions and the (un-)making of society 
Interestingly, this influence of emotions on semantics, argumentation and speech acts has 
important implications for the organization of societies. Argumentation as a social interaction 
takes place in social contexts and through the use of normative language and the utterance of 
speech acts, emotions can contribute to the (un-)making of the social world. Indeed, language 
is not only descriptive, it is also constitutive of social reality (Searle, 1998): the creation, the 
maintenance and the destruction of institutional facts is the result of speech acts, and in 
particular of declarations (Searle, 1998, 2010). Since emotions can ground speech acts, among 
which declarations, one can say that emotions can play a fundamental role in the emergence, 
the iteration, and the disappearance of institutional facts. But these effects of emotions on the 
social world depend on various “felicity conditions” (Austin, 1975) which can be internal to 
the speaker (was the speaker sincere when he spoke, for instance) or external to him and 
dependent upon objective institutional backgrounds (who is authorized to speak, according to 
which collectively recognized procedures, in which relevant circumstances, etc.). But since 
speech acts grounded in emotions have correction conditions, these are also to be included 
among the felicity conditions of the uttered speech acts. For instance, the declaration “I forgive 
you” would be felicitous if it is uttered in the appropriate social context, by the authorized 
person, according to the right procedure, with sincerity, and because forgiveness is or has been 
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correctly felt by the speaker (i.e. the person, toward which forgiveness is felt and toward which 
the speech act is directed, genuinely made amends for his wrongdoings). 
3.2.1. Legislative processes as rituals of institution 
The role of emotions and speech acts in the making of social institutions can be empirically 
observed in the archetypal social situation of “rituals of institution” 25 of whom legislative 
processes are important specimens26. I take as an example of these my study of the emergence 
of the rules of the charters of good conduct in a small-scale society; the political collective 
Occupy Geneva (Minner, 2015, 2018). These rules consisted in the “internal legal norms” of 
this society, which was organized according to principles of deliberative and participatory 
democracy and contractualism, which constituted the institutional background of the 
collective27. By looking at how emotions motivated and structured the normative judgements, 
speech acts and arguments uttered by the members during the legislative processes (general 
assemblies or small working groups) which accompanied the emergence of these legal norms, 
the studies show that various collective emotions grounded the collective deliberations. Over 
the course of these deliberations the contents and the forms of the norms were discussed by the 
members, decided and collectively promulgated by declarations resulting from consensus. The 
speech acts that instituted these new institutional norms were felicitous because they were 
uttered by authorized persons (i.e. the members of the assembly) and according to the 
democratic procedural rules of the collective which stated that collective decisions ought to 
result from a consensus. The speech acts were also felicitous because they resulted from 
emotions that were collectively deemed to be socially appropriate and correctly felt. Thus, for 
example, from collective indignation, contempt, and forgiveness resulted respectively norms to 
punish deviant members, to exclude unworthy members, and to reintegrate those who, expelled 
from the group, had repented for their misdemeanours. These emotions then played a role in 
the creation of these legal norms. 
Very interestingly, contempt, through dishonour and exclusion of the group, could contribute 
to the destruction of the social status of a member, while forgiveness, by motivating 
reconciliation and reintegration, contributed to honour recovery and to the recreation of the 
status of member. In addition, these norms were created in the context of a conscious effort to 
                                                 
25 On speech acts and rituals of institution see Bourdieu (2001). 
26 On the emotional sources of legal norms see for instance (Bandes and Blumenthal, 2012; Durkheim, 2007 
[1893]; Nussbaum, 2001; Sajó, 2011, 2016). 
27 The members of this society followed the “fiction of the social pact”: each collective rule had to be debated, 
between equals, during the general assemblies, and be the object of a consensus before being adopted and 
recognized as legally valid within the collective. 
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maintain the existence of the collective over time, by its members. These empirical studies show 
that emotions, by grounding normative judgements, speech acts, and argumentation possess an 
instituting power which can contribute to the (un-)making of the institutions of a society by 
creating, maintaining and destroying its social institutions. 
4. Conclusion 
Emotions by virtue of their cognitive tendencies have the potential of generating and directing 
thoughts: emotions motivate and structure reasoning. In that sense, each emotion type can be 
considered a mode of thinking: when indignant an individual starts to think and sustain thoughts 
specific to indignation; when contemptuous an individual starts to think and sustain thoughts 
specific to contempt. As modes of thinking emotions help individuals use their normative 
concepts, and help them use the lexicon of the given type. Emotion types bear also various 
normative relations to their objects and incorporate intrinsic “affective oughts” by virtue of 
which occurrent emotions can be assessed as (in-)correct if they (un-)fit their objects. These 
ideas led to distinguish between the intrinsic norms and the extrinsic norms of emotions: the 
first one belonging to the internal normative structure of emotion types; the second one being 
external emotion norms that state when emotions are socially appropriate. The notion of 
correctness was also associated to questions related to the explanation and justification of 
emotions, and of their constitutive normative judgements: emotions can be reasons for 
justifying and explaining their intrinsic value and deontic judgements, and emotions can be 
explained and justified if their cognitive bases represent correctly the world as having the value 
that is relevant to the emotion type under scrutiny. Because of these various explanation and 
justification relations emotions can be argued: individuals can build argumentations that are 
grounded in their felt emotions. Emotions in that sense, by virtue of being modes of thinking, 
can generate and structure arguments by providing them their contents and by articulating the 
norms and values associated with emotion types. Argumentation being typically a social 
practice by which speech acts are uttered in order to convince the public, emotions can motivate 
different kinds of speech acts—especially declarative ones that aim at realizing the intentional 
goals provided by the action tendencies of emotions: through the statement of norms, values 
are promoted. These account for the fact that emotions have the potential of leading to speech 
acts and to argumentation, and seem to play a fundamental and irreducible role in the creation, 
maintenance, and destruction of institutional facts. Indeed, emotions seem to be able to 
contribute to the (un-)making of social reality. These various theses show that emotions play a 
fundamental role in social explanation by providing explanation of how individuals reason with 
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respect to their values and norms and of how they argue in social situations thanks to their 
speech acts by which they can affect social life and organization. Emotions and their rhetorical 
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